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The Liability of Physicians and Associated Personnel for Malpractice in Genetic Screening

  • Jon R. Waltz

Abstract

The topic to be discussed in this paper is narrowly defined: the potential malpractice liability of physicians and personnel associated with them in the conduct of genetic screening. The paper’s title is perhaps inappropriately contracted, since a measure of potential legal liability in the screening context arises from doctrinal bases other than the principles of medical malpractice. Topic titles to the contrary notwithstanding, those additional principles will not be ignored in the discussion that follows.

Keywords

Genetic Screening Genetic Test Result Hypodermic Needle Medical Malpractice Symposium Specialist 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jon R. Waltz
    • 1
  1. 1.Northwestern University School of LawUSA

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