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Does the NPT Matter?

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Beyond 1995

Part of the book series: Issues in International Security ((IIS))

Abstract

As the twenty-fifth anniversary of the NPT approaches, interest grows in assessing the contribution and importance of the treaty to averting the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five states that possessed them at the time that the treaty was opened for signature in 1968. The treaty, in Article IX.3, defines a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.” By that definition only India, with its detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, has crossed the line. India’s insistent denial that it has become a weapon state and that its 1974 test was anything more than the test of a peaceful nuclear device, reinforced by the absence of any evidence of a second nuclear test or the weaponization of its nuclear program, permits the conclusion that the number of states qualifying as NWSs under NPT criteria remains the same as it was twenty years ago.

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Notes and References

  1. NPT/CONF. III/64/I, Annex I, p. 1.

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  2. Ibid., p. 2.

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  3. Ibid.

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  4. Ibid., p. 3.

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  5. K. Subrahmanyam, Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1985–1986), p. 275.

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  6. NPT/CONF. III/64/I, Annex I, p. 12.

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  7. See Girilal Jain, “India,” in J. Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation, The Why and the Wherefore (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 89,93.

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  8. Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 226ff.

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  9. See Thomas B. Johansson, “Sweden’s Abortive Nuclear Weapons Project,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1986), p. 33.

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  10. See Reiss, Without the Bomb, pp. 238-239.

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  11. Admittedly, this is a two-edged sword. If Israel is sensitive to U.S. policy on nonproliferation, the United States is also aware that weakening of its support for Israeli security could alter Israeli views on how to play its nuclear card. The same holds true for South Korea, whose nonproliferation posture is closely tied to the continued presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula. United States withdrawal could be the “extraordinary event” triggering South Korean withdrawal from the NPT. That risk enables South Korea to hold the U.S. presence hostage to its continued commitment to nonproliferation.

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© 1990 Plenum Press, New York

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Scheinman, L. (1990). Does the NPT Matter?. In: Pilat, J.F., Pendley, R.E. (eds) Beyond 1995. Issues in International Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1315-1_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1315-1_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-1317-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-1315-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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