Conclusions

Abstract

What are the prospects, then, for the NPT beyond 1995? Will it survive or succumb? Advocates as well as critics of the treaty recognize that it is the centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime, has promoted confidence by helping to assure states that their neighbors are not developing nuclear weapons, and has furthered the nonproliferation norm. And while none of the authors hold that the NPT is more important than security considerations in national decisions on whether or not to go nuclear, the treaty is viewed as nonetheless vital by the majority of the contributors. According to Lawrence Scheinman, “It cannot be said, nor should it be expected, that the NPT alone can or does prevent proliferation. The single most important factor in nonproliferation is a decision by national political authorities that acquiring nuclear weapons or retaining an option to do so is not in the national interest. That decision is based on a presumably reasoned calculation of political and security requirements and national interests. ... Where the NPT becomes relevant is in its contribution to the shaping of political and security perceptions and to the calculation of whether the national interest is better served by forswearing or by maintaining a weapon option, or even by actually acquiring nuclear weapons.” Yet, despite this widespread perception of the value of the NPT, virtually every contributor recognized that in 1995 the treaty will not go unchallenged by parties and nonparties alike, and a struggle for its extension can be anticipated. Although most of the contributors believe that the treaty will survive, a catastrophic failure of the NPT was recognized as all too possible.