Fisheries Reserve Model

Abstract

In the part on “Ecological Models,” we modeled the fate of a common property resource, and in the previous chapter of we dealt with the optimal use of a renewable resource. Let us now discuss the management of common-property renewable resources. A typical example of such a resource is fisheries. Anybody who has access to oceans and shorelines may engage in fishing activities. As long as profits can be made from fisheries there is the incentive to increase fishing effort. As a result, pressure on the fish population increases, potentially leading to the collapse of the resource. Standard approaches to dealing with the tragedy of the commons include licensing of fishing boats and gear, restrictions of fishing seasons, and limitations on the harvestable size of fish. Regulations and control measures affecting the fishing industries are frequently difficult to enforce, particularly on the oceans, and are therefore not likely to be very effective.

Our model is based on a more elaborate version of marine fishery management worked out by Holland (1993).