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A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness

  • Georges Rey

Abstract

I was asked, as a philosopher, to address an audience primarily of psychobiologists about the nature of consciousness. Many people—among them, quite likely, many readers of the present volume—might find this a little strange: After all, would a conference of physicists really invite a philosopher to address them on the nature of matter? Or of biologists on the nature of life? Perhaps; but why not? Let me first say something about the sort of thing a philosopher may legitimately have to say, before going on to make what I hope will be some useful, substantive claims of my own.

Keywords

Modal Logic Turing Machine Propositional Attitude Intentional System Code Number 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Georges Rey
    • 1
  1. 1.Division of HumanitiesState University of New York at PurchasePurchaseUSA

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