Abstract
Owen Egan has given us a masterly survey of the psychological literature on belief. He leads us into alleys that we might not have anticipated visiting, such as the status of basic logical laws. He considers the possibility that such laws can profitably be regarded as master beliefs that guide the formation of lower-order beliefs. Everywhere there are interesting comments on research techniques and designs, on the interpretation of findings, and on the basic conceptualization of what belief is that inspires data gathering and interpretation.
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© 1986 Plenum Press, New York
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Macnamara, J. (1986). But What is Belief Itself?. In: Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Annals of Theoretical Psychology, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_25
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