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Human and Machine Perception pp 255–270Cite as

Symbolic, Conceptual and Subconceptual Representations

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Abstract

Cognitive science aims at understanding how information is represented and processed in different kinds of agents, biological as well as artificial. The research has two overarching goals. One is explanatory: by studying the cognitive activities of humans and other animals, one formulates theories of different kinds of cognition. The theories are tested either by experiments or by computer simulations. The other goal is constructive: by building artefacts like chess-playing programs, robots, animates, etc., one attempts to construct systems that can solve various cognitive tasks. For both kinds of goals, a key problem is how the information used by the cognitive system is to be modelled in an appropriate way.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cognitive Science, Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundagård, Lund, S-223 50, Sweden

    Peter Gärdenfors

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  1. Peter Gärdenfors
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Virginio Cantoni  & Alessandra Setti  & 

  2. University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Vito Di Gesù  & Domenico Tegolo  & 

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Gärdenfors, P. (1997). Symbolic, Conceptual and Subconceptual Representations. In: Cantoni, V., Di Gesù, V., Setti, A., Tegolo, D. (eds) Human and Machine Perception. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5965-8_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5965-8_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7734-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5965-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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