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Restructuring and Competitive Arrangements in the Electricity Supply Industry Towards a Better Efficiency?

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Deregulation of Electric Utilities

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 28))

Abstract

The technological specificities of the electricity filière, calling for high levels of technical co-ordination between its stages, has in the past been reflected by the long domination of an industrial organization based on vertical and horizontal integration and a regulated supply monopoly.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut d’Économie et de Politique de l’Énergie, CNRS et Université de Grenoble, France

    Dominique Finon

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  1. Dominique Finon
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. GERAD and CETAI, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Montréal, Canada

    Georges Zaccour

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Finon, D. (1998). Restructuring and Competitive Arrangements in the Electricity Supply Industry Towards a Better Efficiency?. In: Zaccour, G. (eds) Deregulation of Electric Utilities. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 28. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5729-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5729-6_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7624-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5729-6

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