Abstract
Independent contractors, such as lawyers, architects, builders and accountants, often have numerous, long-term customers who require a great deal of personal attention. A fundamental problem for independent contractors is balancing the desire to fulfill the needs of current customers while at the same time acquiring new customers. A common complaint among customers of independent contractors is that the customer feels that that he or she is not receiving the desired amount of attention from the independent contractor.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Gifford, S. (1998). Independent Contractors. In: The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5605-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5605-3_9
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