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Access Demands and Network Joint Ventures

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Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 27))

Abstract

Joint ventures play a critical role in the U.S. economy. Often they will seek to limit their membership and when they do they face the risk that an excluded party will resort to antitrust litigation in order to compel its admission.3 Antitrust access disputes have had a profound impact on competition among network joint ventures, which include credit cards, Automated Teller Machine (ATM), and Point of Sale (POS) networks. There recently has been a bounty of litigation in this area, spurred by the lack of clarity in the legal standards.4 Thus, competitors are often encouraged to compete through litigation (or by arranging treaties), rather than by offering better products or services.

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Balto, D.A. (1998). Access Demands and Network Joint Ventures. In: Gabel, D., Weiman, D.F. (eds) Opening Networks to Competition. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 27. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5483-7_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5483-7_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7505-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5483-7

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