Abstract
Profound changes in technology and the rapid growth in telecommunications markets have created conditions in which production of most telecommunications services by competitive suppliers can now be presumed to be little, if any, more costly than monopoly production. In these circumstances, the earlier goal of regulation—to protect consumers against monopoly exploitation—should be replaced by the goal of fostering conditions favorable to competition and encouraging efficient markets. As liberalization of the telecommunications sector proceeds, regulatory involvement in telecommunications markets should be reduced to the minimum activities necessary to ensure that those markets are competitive.
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Mitchell, B.M., Vogelsang, I. (1998). Markup Pricing for Interconnection: A Conceptual Framework. In: Gabel, D., Weiman, D.F. (eds) Opening Networks to Competition. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 27. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5483-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5483-7_3
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