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Monopoly Leveraging, Path Dependency, and the Case for a Local Competition Threshold for RBOC Entry into Interlata Toll

  • T. Randolph Beard
  • David L. Kaserman
  • John W. Mayo
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 30)

Abstract

One of the cornerstones of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (without which the Act probably would not have been passed) is Section 271.1 This Section establishes the criteria under which the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) will be allowed to enter (or, more accurately, reenter) the interLATA long-distance market. Specifically, under the 271 provisions, an RBOC’s reintegration within its certificated geographic territory is made contingent upon the satisfaction of four necessary preconditions.3

Keywords

Local Exchange Vertical Integration Path Dependency Price Discrimination Federal Communication Commission 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. Randolph Beard
  • David L. Kaserman
  • John W. Mayo

There are no affiliations available

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