Abstract
1. In his enthusiastic endorsement of Nigel Howard’s (1966; 1966a; 1971) “escape from paradox” of the prisoner’s dilemma, Anatol Rapoport (1967, p.50) made an interesting observation to the following effect: “Whenever, in any discipline, we discover a problem that cannot be solved within the conceptual framework that supposedly should apply, we experience an intellectual shock. The shock may compel us to discard the old framework and adopt a new one. It is to this process of intellectual molting that we owe the birth of many of the major ideas in mathematics and science.”
Paper presented at The Twelfth Annual Japan-U.S. Technical Symposium on “Global Integration and Competition”, January 14–15, 1998 held at Shimoda, Japan. I am grateful to Professors K.J. Arrow, S.-Ch. Kolm, P. K. Pattanaik, and A. K. Sen for their helpful discussions and constant encouragements over many years. Thanks are also due to Professors T. Besley, B. Grodal, H. Hori, E. Maskin, K. Roberts, and P. A. Samuelson for their comments and criticisms on an earlier presentation of this paper. Last but not least, my thanks go to the financial support provided by The Matsushita International Foundation and New York University.
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Suzumura, K. (1999). Consequentialism and Procedural Evaluations in Social Welfare Judgements. In: Sato, R., Ramachandran, R.V., Mino, K. (eds) Global Competition and Integration. Research Monographs in Japan-U.S. Business & Economics, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5109-6_4
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