Abstract
Most economic models of learning study how individuals adapt behavior over time. These models differ mainly in the rules according to which individuals determine to act and these rules are usually assumed to be stable. But, in general, learning is far more complicated than that since individuals also learn on the level of rules. In the present study we introduce an approach to this kind of learning. We will focus on a rule by which individuals evaluate the consequences of their behavior, a rule specifying how to value outcomes of interaction. In economic terms such rules are usually called preferences and, in fact, we will focus on how preferences may be learned over time.
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Huck, S., Müller, W., Strobel, M. (1999). On the Emergence of Attitudes Towards Risk. In: Brenner, T. (eds) Computational Techniques for Modelling Learning in Economics. Advances in Computational Economics, vol 11. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5029-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5029-7_5
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