Advertisement

The Polycentric City

  • Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou
  • David Pines
Part of the Advances in Urban and Regional Economics book series (UREC, volume 1)

Abstract

In this chapter we treat urban centres as facilities collectively used by the whole or part of the urban population. We employ the framework of club theory, which accounts for the collective use of facilities as a way of enhancing the utility level of club members. 1 We discuss the fundamentals of non-spatial club theory, and we extend it to the spatial domain. A single club in this context provides the analog of a monocentric city, while a system of clubs corresponds to a polycentric city. Although the spatial structure of the polycentric system we present here resembles that of chapter eight, in the sense that both are based on nested market areas and individuals patronise several centres in both, it differs with respect to spatial organisation because, unlike the polycentric city of chapter eight, no central facility here supplies more than a single collective good. We characterise the optimal size of such a system, and we explain why decentralisation must be undertaken at the level of the urban territory itself, rather than at the level of individual facilities as suggested by fiscal federalism. We then study in detail a simplified version of this model in order to understand what characterises the transition from a monocentric to a polycentric urban structure and what determines whether the location of a public facility will be central or peripheral.

Keywords

Market Area Optimal Complex Collective Good Land Rent User Charge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. R.J. Arnott, 1979, Optimal City Size in a Spatial Economy. Journal of Urban Economics 6, 65–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. R.J. Arnott and J.E. Stiglitz, 1979, Aggregate Land Rent, Expenditure on Public Goods, and the Optimal City Size. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 471–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. V. Barham and M.H. Wooders, 1998, First and Second Welfare Theorems for Economies with Collective Goods. In D. Pines, E. Sadka, and I. Zilcha (eds.), Topics in Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, New York, 57–88.Google Scholar
  4. E. Berglas, 1976, On the Theory of Clubs. American Economic Review 66, 116–121.Google Scholar
  5. E. Berglas and D. Pines, 1980, Clubs as a Case of Competitive Industry with Goods of Variable Quality. Economics Letters 5, 363–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. E. Berglas and D. Pines, 1981, Clubs, Local Public Goods, and Transportation Models: A Synthesis. Journal of Public Economics 15, 141–162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. J.K. Brueckner and K. Lee, 1991, Economies of Scope and Multiproduct Clubs. Public Finance Quarterly 19, 193–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. J.M. Buchanan, 1965, An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica 32, 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. J.P. Conley and M.H. Wooders, 1998, Anonymous Pricing in Tiebout Economies with Clubs. In D. Pines, E. Sadka, and I. Zilcha (eds.), Topics in Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, New York, 89–120.Google Scholar
  10. F. Flatters, J.V. Henderson and P. Mieszkowski, 1974, Public Goods, Efficiency and Regional Fiscal Equalization. Journal of Public Economics 3, 99–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. M. Fujita, 1989, Urban Economic Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. M. Fujita and H. Ogawa, 1982, Multiple Equilibria and Structural Transition of Non-Monocentric Urban Configurations. Regional Science and Urban Economics 12, 161–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. M. Fujita, J.-F. Thisse and Y. Zenou, 1997, On the Endogenous Formation of Secondary Employment Center. Journal of Urban Economics 41, 337–357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. H. George, 1896, Progress and Poverty. Reprinted by the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1954.Google Scholar
  15. R.P. Gilles and S.A. Scotchmer, 1998, Decentralization in Club Economies: How Multiple Private Goods Matter. In D. Pines, E. Sadka, and I. Zilcha (eds.), Topics in Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, New York, 121–138.Google Scholar
  16. R.M. Haig, 1926, Toward an Understanding of the Metropolis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 40, 421–423.Google Scholar
  17. O. Hochman, 1981, Land Rents, Optimal Taxation and Local Fiscal Independence in an Economy with Local Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics 15, 59–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. O. Hochman, 1982a, Congestable Local Public Goods in an Urban Setting. Journal of Urban Economics 11, 290–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. O. Hochman, 1982b, Clubs in an Urban Setting. Journal of Urban Economics 12, 85–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. O. Hochman, D. Pines and J.-F. Thisse, 1995, On the Optimal Structure of Local Governments. The American Economic Review 85, 1224–1240.Google Scholar
  21. B. Holmstrom, 1982, Moral Hazard in a Team. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324–340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. H. Imai, 1982, CBD Hypothesis and the Economics of Agglomeration. Journal of Economic Theory 28, 275–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. T. Malthus, 1798, An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society. Reprinted by Pelican, London, 1970.Google Scholar
  24. T. Mori, 1997, A Modelling of Megalopolis Formation: The Maturing of City Systems. Journal of Urban Economics 42, 133–157.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. W.E. Oates, 1972, Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovenovich, New York.Google Scholar
  26. H. Ogawa and M. Fujita, 1980, Equilibrium Land Use Pattern in a Non-Monocentric City. Journal of Regional Science 20, 455–475.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. M. Olson Jr., 1969, The Principle of ‘Fiscal Equivalence’: The Division of Responsibility Among Different Levels of Government. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 59, 479–487.Google Scholar
  28. D. Ricardo, 1821, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Reprinted by George Bell & Sons Ltd, London, 1891.Google Scholar
  29. S. Rosen, 1974, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition. Journal of Political Economy 82, 34–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. P.A. Samuelson, 1954, A Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 36, 387–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. S.A. Scotchmer, 1994, Public Goods and the Invisible Hand. In J. Quigley and E. Smolensky (eds.) Modern Public Finance. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 93–125.Google Scholar
  32. S.A. Scotchmer and M.H. Wooders, 1987, Competitive Equilibrium and the Core in Club Economies with Anonymous Crowding. Journal of Public Economics 34, 159–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. D.M. Starrett, 1988, Foundations of Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. J.E. Stiglitz, 1977, The Theory of Local Public Goods. In Martin Feldstein and Robert P. Inman (eds.) The Economics of Public Services. Macmillan, London, 274–333.Google Scholar
  35. J.-F. Thisse and D.E. Wildasin, 1992, Public Facility Location and Urban Spatial Structure: Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis. Journal of Public Economics 48, 83–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. C.M. Tiebout, 1956, A Pure Theory of Local Public Goods. Journal of Political Economy 64, 416–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. M.H. Wooders, 1978, Equilibria, the Core, and Jurisdiction Structures in Economies with a Local Public Good. Journal of Economic Theory 18, 328–348.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou
    • 1
  • David Pines
    • 2
  1. 1.McMaster UniversityCanada
  2. 2.Tel Aviv UniversityIsrael

Personalised recommendations