Abstract
Corruption affects and distorts what should be arms’ length, or objective and unbiased, relationships between government officials and private sector individuals. Through the payment of bribes, some individuals succeed in getting favorable treatment in their economic activities from public officials. Such a treatment can either reduce the costs for the economic activities in which the individuals are engaged or it can create new opportunities for them that are not available to others. Acts of corruption may be initiated either by private individuals or by government officials. When it is the latter, they may offer favorable treatment in exchange for a bribe or some other favor. When this happens, corruption disrupts the competitive situation that exists in the market and may give a competitive advantage to some individuals or enterprises.
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Tanzi, V. (1998). Corruption and the Budget: Problems and Solutions. In: Jain, A.K. (eds) Economics of Corruption. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 65. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_6
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