Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design

  • Alvin E. Roth
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 23)


Markets evolve, but they are also designed. Entrepreneurs and managers, legislators and regulators, lawyers and judges, all get involved, at least indirectly, in market design. Recently game theorists have also started to take a direct role in design. This is a natural development, because game theory is the part of economics that deals with the “rules of the game” that define market operations.


Game Theory Stable Matchings Spot Market Preference List Medical Market 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alvin E. Roth
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and Graduate School of Business AdministrationHarvard UniversityBostonUSA

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