Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design
Markets evolve, but they are also designed. Entrepreneurs and managers, legislators and regulators, lawyers and judges, all get involved, at least indirectly, in market design. Recently game theorists have also started to take a direct role in design. This is a natural development, because game theory is the part of economics that deals with the “rules of the game” that define market operations.
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