Capturing the Elusive Social Impacts of Technology

Abstract

Canada, like many other industrial countries at the millennium, seems, as John Meisel so articulates it, “hell-bent on pursuing, through S&T [Science and Technology], the flickering grail of wealth, economic competitiveness, and something ambiguously called ‘the quality of life,’ defined invariably in terms of purely physical well-being” (1998:153). The “hell-bent” stance includes a strong element of management, as evidenced in the February 1999 federal budget in Canada which put the lion’s share of increased spending on science into structures which are thought to have more controlled, determined and significantly “accountable” outcomes. The holy grail is expanded to include a presumed, but decidedly elusive, productivity benefit, and well-being beyond the physical. However, in “investing in science” with the full anticipation of returns on the dollar, “Our rulers,” in the words of Sir John Kingman, “want to know in advance where science will lead, and are not pleased to be told that science does not work like that” (Kingman, 1998:8–9). Neither, of course, does the process whereby science and technology have social impacts. What Kingman (1998:8) terms the “trufflehound principle,” whereby the instincts of the best scientists are taken as the soundest guide to where new discoveries are to be found, is overthrown in favour of governments picking “winners” a priori or picking those areas which are thought to be most likely to produce social benefits. This is not something at which anyone has excelled, if the past be any guide.