Abstract
Automobile insurance costs have become a potent political issue in the United States. In recent years, the auto insurance consumer price index (CPI) has grown at an annual rate considerably higher than the all items CPI. This high inflation occurred during a period when auto accident rates were declining (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996, National Association of Independent Insurers, 1996). The result has been growing dissatisfaction among consumers and increased pressure on insurers from legislators and regulators. In some states, more stringent regulation has led to inadequate prices and declining profits, threatening the stability of the market.
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Cummins, J.D., Weiss, M.A. (1999). The Incentive Effects of No Fault Automobile Insurance. In: Dionne, G., Laberge-Nadeau, C. (eds) Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance, and Economic Security, vol 20. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4058-8_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4058-8_20
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