Price Setting for Doctors

  • Kristina Burström
  • Rafael Gisin
Part of the Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy book series (HEPP, volume 7)


The Swedish and the Swiss health-care systems are organized in strikingly different ways. In Sweden, most doctors work as salaried public-sector employees. In Switzerland physicians operate their own private businesses. Revenue is regulated on a fee-for-service basis. This discrepancy allows us to compare the effects of two payment schemes, which have been discussed widely in the health economics literature.1 On the one hand, we observe fixed prepayment in Sweden, said to ensure equal treatment of patients regardless of health status. On the other hand, we analyze the effects of fee-for-service payment, a method widely regarded as providing an incentive for the over-treatment of patients (the supplier-induced demand hypothesis).


Medical Service Health Insurer County Council Payment Scheme Price Setting 
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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kristina Burström
  • Rafael Gisin

There are no affiliations available

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