Abstract
The Swedish and the Swiss health-care systems are organized in strikingly different ways. In Sweden, most doctors work as salaried public-sector employees. In Switzerland physicians operate their own private businesses. Revenue is regulated on a fee-for-service basis. This discrepancy allows us to compare the effects of two payment schemes, which have been discussed widely in the health economics literature.1 On the one hand, we observe fixed prepayment in Sweden, said to ensure equal treatment of patients regardless of health status. On the other hand, we analyze the effects of fee-for-service payment, a method widely regarded as providing an incentive for the over-treatment of patients (the supplier-induced demand hypothesis).
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Burström, K., Gisin, R. (1998). Price Setting for Doctors. In: Zweifel, P., Lyttkens, C.H., Söderström, L. (eds) Regulation of Health: Case Studies of Sweden and Switzerland. Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy, vol 7. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4052-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4052-6_5
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