Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Franchise Bidding for Public Utilities Revisited

  • Chapter
Competition and the Regulation of Utilities

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 7))

Abstract

Analogous to the reforms sweeping through Eastern Europe, important changes have been taking place in Western utility industries. Competition has been occurring in telecommunications and gas and is beginning to take place in electricity. Price-cap regulation is beginning to be employed in telecommunications. Privatization and calls for privatization are on the rise. Such changes are all raising serious questions about the life expectancy of rate-of-return (ROR) regulation and whether, in the traditional set-up and implementation of public policy towards utilities, too little consideration has been given to market-oriented solutions to natural monopoly problems.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Baron, David, and Robert Taggart. 1980. “Regulatory Pricing Procedures and Economic Incentives.” In Issues in Public-Utility Pricing and Regulation edited by M.A. Crew. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Broadman, Harry G., and Joseph P. Kalt. 1989. “How Natural is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass in Natural Gas Distribution Markets,” Yale Journal on Regulation 6 (no. 2, Summer):181–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, Lorenzo, Michael Einhorn, and Ingo Vogelsang. 1989. “Incentive Regulation- A Research Report,” Office of Economic Policy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Technical Report 89–3(November).

    Google Scholar 

  • Crew, Michael A., and Paul R. Kleindorfer. 1987. “Productivity Incentives and Rate-ofReturn Regulation.” In Regulating Utilities in an Era of Deregulation edited by M.A. Crew. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, Harold E. 1968. “Why Regulate Public Utilities?,” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (no. 1, April): 55–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldberg, Victor P. 1976. “Regulation and Administered Contracts,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 7 (no.2, Autumn): 426–448.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, Robert G.1990. “R&D in U.S. and Japaneses Telecommunications.”In Competition and the Regulation of Utilities edited by M.A. Crew. Boston: Kluwer (forthcoming).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hillman, Jordan J. and Ronald R. Braeutigam.1989. Price Level Regulation for Diversified Public Utilities: An Assessment. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe, Adam B. and David M. Kanter. 1989. “Market Power of Local Television Franchises: Evidence From the Effects of Deregulation,” unpublished working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University, (July).

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, Michael C. 1988. “Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (no. 1, Winter): 21–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, Paul L. 1974. “Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation ” Journal of Law and Economics 17 (no. 2, October): 291–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, Paul L. 1985. “Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants ” Journal of Law Economics and Organization 1 (no. 1, Spring): 33–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, Paul L. and Richard Schmalensee. 1983. Markets for Power: AnAnalysis of Electric Utility Deregulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics 21 (no. 3, October): 297–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, Benjamin and Keith Leffler. 1981. “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contrac-tual Performance,” Journal of Political Economy 89 (no. 4, December): 615–641.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kroeber, Charles R. 1989. “A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers,” Journal of Law Economics and Organization 5 (no. 2, Fall): 271–292.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacAvoy, Paul W, Daniel F. Spulber, and Bruce E. Stangle. 1989. “Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets,” Yale Journal on Regulation 6 (no. 2, Summer): 209–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noll, Roger G. 1987. “The Twisted Pair: Regulation and Competition in Telecommunications,” Regulation 3/4: 15–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noll, Roger G. and Bruce M. Owen. 1988. “U.S. v. AT&T: The Economic Issues,” in The Antitrust Revolution John Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence White eds. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olmstead, Alan L. and Paul Rhode. 1985. “Rationing Without Government: The West Coast Gas Famine of 1920,” American Economic Review 75 (no. 5, December): 1044–1056.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peacock, Alan T., and Charles K. Rowley. 1972. “Welfare Economics and the Public Regulation of Natural Monopoly.” Journal of Public Economics (June): 227–244. Posner

    Google Scholar 

  • Richard A. 1972. “The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry,” Bell Journal of Economics 3 (no. 1, Spring): 211–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, Richard A. 1986. Economic Analysis of Law. 2nd. ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prager, Robin A. 1986. “Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets: The Case of Cable Television,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prager, Robin A. 1989. “Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly: The Case of Cable Television inMassachusetts.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 1 (no. 2, June): 115–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rothkopf, Michael J., Thomas J. Teisberg, and Edward P. Kahn. 1990. “Why are Vickrey Auctions Rare?” Journal of Political Economy 98:94–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmalensee, Richard. 1979. The Control of Natural Monopolies Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shew, William B. 1984. Costs of Cable Television Franchise Requirements White Plains, New York: National Economic Research Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Webb, G. Kent. 1983. The Economics of Cable Television Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver. 1976. “Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 7 (no. 1, Spring): 73–104.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zupan, Mark A. I989a. “Nonprice Concessions and the Effect of Franchise Bidding Schemes on Cable Company Costs.” Applied Economics 21 (no. 3, March): 305–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zupan, Mark A. 1989b. “A Test for Regulatory Lag and the Role Played by Periodic Contract Renewals in Mitigating Such Lag in Local Cable Franchise Relationships.” Journal of Regulatory Economics (no. 1, March): 1–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zupan, Mark A. 1989c. “The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of CATV: Some Systematic Evidence.” Journal of Law and Economics 32 (no. 2, part 1, October): 401–456.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zupan, Mark A. 1989d. “Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically?” Rand Journal of Economics 20 (no. 4, Winter): 473–484.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zupan, Mark A. 1989e. “Should Franchise Bidding Schemes be Employed to Regulate Integrated Broadband Networks?” Working Paper, USC School of Business, (February).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. A. Michael Crew
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Mark A. Zupan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Michael A. Crew

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Crew, A.M., Zupan, M.A. (1991). Franchise Bidding for Public Utilities Revisited. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Competition and the Regulation of Utilities. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 7. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4048-9_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4048-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-6811-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-4048-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation