Abstract

The advantages obtained from differentiation of products and services all stem ultimately from differences among customers. A product line serves customers better to the extent it includes products tailored to the preferences of specific market segments. Gains in efficiency from greater differentiation can be shared between customers and firms in various ways: in perfectly regulated or competitive markets the gains remain with customers, but in incompletely regulated or imperfectly competitive markets the firms can obtain profits from some degree of monopoly pricing, which of course also diminishes somewhat the gains obtained.

Keywords

Transportation Assure Product Line Dispatch Lost 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Wilson
    • 1
  1. 1.Stanford Graduate School of BusinessUSA

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