Abstract
Deutsche Mark und Deutsche Bundesbank — mit einem dunklen Rätsel nähern sich beide ihrem Ende.1 In November 1990, the presidents of the central banks of the member states of the European Community (EC) published a proposal for the statute of a European central bank (ECB). According to this proposal, the primary objective of the bank will be to maintain price stability. The bank will be required to support the economic policy of the Community, but without prejudice to the objective of price stability. The ECB and its national member banks will be granted independence from political interference. The bank’s directorate will be composed of a president, a vice-president and four other members, all of which will be appointed by the European Council for eight years without the possibility of renewal. These appointees will form the bank’s council together with the twelve presidents of the national central banks. Decisions will be made by simple majority rule. Generally one member will have one vote, the president a tie-breaking vote; but for some issues weighted voting will apply.2
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Lohmann, S. (1994). Designing a Central Bank in a Federal System: The Deutsche Bundesbank, 1957-1992. In: Siklos, P.L. (eds) Varieties of Monetary Reforms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2720-6_10
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