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Communication Requirements for Individual Agents in Networks and Hierarchies

  • Thomas Marschak
  • Stefan Reichelstein

Abstract

Stanley Reiter has been a pioneer in studying the informational requirements of resource allocation mechanisms. Reiter and Hurwicz were the first to show us how to work with one important measure of a mechanism’s informational cost, namely the number of variables communicated, or— more generally—the size of the mechanism’s message space (Hurwicz, 1972, 1977; Mount and Reiter, 1974). They developed techniques for determining the minimal message-space size if the mechanism’s outcome is to meet a specified standard. The techniques remain fundamental. The present paper, for example, is strongly influenced by them.1

Keywords

Effort Vector Efficient Frontier Price Mechanism Total Effort Message Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Marschak
  • Stefan Reichelstein

There are no affiliations available

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