Skip to main content

Strategic issues, producer-supplier relationships and the economics of quality

  • Chapter
Book cover The Management of Quality and its Control
  • 221 Accesses

Abstract

The need for a strategy arises because choices are not obvious. Better quality at any price is a naive strategy which recently turned out to be right because the cost of quality has been grossly understated and the benefits of quality entirely unaccounted for. Today it is believed that a comprehensive approach to the design and management of quality is essential to strengthen a firm’s competitive position. An investment in quality must be justified by an acceptable rate of return, however. In an article on quality, Business Week (August 8, 1994) reports that there is an overwhelming concern that quality must pay. For example, Varian, a Silicon Valley firm, went about reinventing the way it did business with what seemed to be stunning results. A unit that makes vacuum systems for computer clean rooms boosted on-time delivery from 42% to 92%. The radiation-equipmentservice department ranked number 1 in its industry for prompt customer visits. But while Varian performed extremely well according to its statistics, it did poorly in the market place. While meeting production schedules, they did not return customers phone calls. Radiation-repair people were so rushed to meet deadlines that they left before explaining their work to customers.The results ended in a lower market share. Over-emphasis on statistical performance and neglect of the firm’s ‘bottom line’ has recurred in many other firms, leading to myopic policies, and subsequently to losses.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Akerlof G. (1970) The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carter J.R. and J.G. Miller (1989) The impact of alternative vendor/buyer communication structures on the quality of purchased materials, Decision Sciences, Fall, 759–775.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox Donald (Editor) (1967) Risk Taking and Information Handling in Consumer Behavior, Boston, Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darrel I. (1991) Software Quality and Reliability, London, Chapman and Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deutsch M.S. and R.R. Willis (1988) Software Quality Engineering, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dresher M. (1961) Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreze J.H. (1977) Demand Theory under quantity rationing: A note, mimeo., CORE

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunn R. (1984) Software Defect Removal, New York, McGraw Hill Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris M. and Raviv A. (1979) Optimal incentive contracts with perfect information, Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 231–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom B. (1979) Moral hazard and observability, Bell J. of Economics, 10, 1, 74–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom B. (1982) Moral hazard in teams, Bell J. of Economics, 13, 324–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ishikawa K. (1987) The quality control audit, Quality Progress, January, 39–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jacoby Jacob and Leon Kaplan (1972) The Components of Perceived Risk, in M. Venkatesan, (Editor), Proceedings: Third Annual Conference,Atlanta Association for Consumer Research, 382–393.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lancaster, K. (1971) Consumer Demand, A New Approach, New York, Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luce R.D. and H. Railfa (1967) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New York, Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moulin H. (1981) Game Theory for the Social Sciences, New York, New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash F. (1950) Equilibrium points in N-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Owen, G. (1982) Game Theory, Academic Press, New York. Reyniers D.J. (1992) Supplier-Customer interaction in quality control, Annals of Operations Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reyniers D.J. and C.S. Tapiero (1995a) Contract design and the control of quality in a conflictual environment, Euro. J. of Operations Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reyniers D.J. and C.S. Tapiero (1995b) The Supply and the Control of Quality in supplier-producer Contracts, Management Science.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sematch (1990) Partnering for Total Quality: Guidebook, Toolkit, Joit assessment guide, Executive implementation and Overview, Austin,Texas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spence A.M. (1977) Consumer misperceptions, product failure and product liability, Review of Economic Studies, 44, 561–572.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz J.E. (1987) The causes and consequences of the dependence of quality on priceJournal of the Economic Literature, March 5, 1–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tapiero C.S. (1993) The statistical control of quality and random payoff games, International Conference on Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, Crete, Greece, May 3–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tapiero C.S. (1994a) Acceptance sampling in a producer-supplier conflicting environment: Risk neutral case, Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tapiero C.S. (1994b) Complexity and the New Industrial Management, OR Insight.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tapiero C.S. and L.F. Hsu (1988) Quality Control of an Unreliable Random FMS with Bernoulli and CSP Sampling, International Journal of Production Research, vol. 26, 1125–1135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wallich P. and M. Holloway (1993) Health care without perverse incentives, Scientific American, July, 109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1996 Charles S. Tapiero

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tapiero, C.S. (1996). Strategic issues, producer-supplier relationships and the economics of quality. In: The Management of Quality and its Control. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2055-9_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2055-9_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5852-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-2055-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics