India and the NPT after the Cold War

  • Raju G. C. Thomas
Part of the Issues in International Security book series (IIS)

Abstract

American efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons would appear more likely to succeed in the post-cold war era than was the case during the cold war. Without the nuclear standoff based on mutual assured destruction between the United States and the former Soviet Union, western nuclear guarantees to third parties would now appear more credible. All states facing potential nuclear threats can be brought under a credible western nuclear umbrella, unless they fear nuclear threats from a U.S.-led West itself. With the West now having achieved undisputed military supremacy, one American “proliferation watcher” even suggested that the United States should not think just in terms of containing nuclear-weapon proliferation, but should attempt now to “win” the war against proliferation.1

Keywords

Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Proliferation Nuclear Disarmament Weapon Program Chemical Weapon Convention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

  1. .
    See Thomas W. Graham, “Winning the Nonproliferation Battle,” Arms Control Today, vol. 21, no. 7 (September 1991), pp. 8–13.Google Scholar
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    See T. T. Poulose, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Second NPT Review Conference,” in K. Subrahmanyam, ed.. Nuclear Myths and Realities: India’s Dilemma (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1981), pp. 21–37.Google Scholar
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    James C. Thompson, Jr., “How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy,” Atlantic Monthly, April 1968, pp. 47–53.Google Scholar
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    See reports by Aziz Haniffa, “Clinton for Sikh Rights in Punjab,” and Tarun Basu, “Delhi Objects to Clinton’s Remarks,” in India Abroad,January 28, 1994.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raju G. C. Thomas
    • 1
  1. 1.Marquette UniversityMilwaukeeUSA

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