Abstract
What are the trends in the evolution of international organizations and regimes with responsibilities in nuclear nonproliferation? On the basis of these trends, what are their prospects for development beyond the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)? This forward-looking assessment and analysis will be attempted on the assumption that the NPT will be extended in 1995 for a reasonably long period of time, if not indefinitely.
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Notes and References
IAEA, GC(XXXVII)/RES/619.
One of the UNDC recommendations stated: “The process of establishing such zones, in appropriate parts of the world, should be encouraged to promote nonproliferation and to contribute to the attainment of the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.” (A/48/42, Annex II, para. 47.)
IAEA, GC(XXXV)/RES/567.
IAEA, GC(XXXVII)/1075, para. 28.
Ibid., para. 32.
Much can be accomplished here through interagency learning. The IAEA, in principle, could consider some new aspects of verification (such as challenge inspections) provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 1. would greatly benefit not only from the agency’s practical experience in conducting safeguards but also in administrative, budgetary, and other matters. Both organizations have already established good working contacts.
Article XII.A.5.
In 1994 the regular budget of the agency amounted to $200 million, with $68.6 million for safeguards.
A similar approach was suggested for financing UN peacekeeping operations (Financing an Effective United Nations. A Report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, 1993).
See Tadeusz Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The Nonproliferation Review ,vol. 1, no. 1, Fall 1993, Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Ibid., p. 10.
At the request of a large group of IAEA members, this text was issued as agency document GC(XXXIV)/INF/291.
Ibid., para. 1 and 18.
A/48/399, p. 6.
There was one recent veto (by Russia on May 11, 1993) to overrule the proposed (by the UK) change in the method of financing the UN peacekeeping operations in Cyprus from voluntary to mandatory. In casting a veto, the Russian representative emphasized, however, that Russia’s position had no political basis and was dictated solely by practical considerations concerning financing. Soon afterwards, on May 27, a compromise resolution was adopted by the council, which provided for a “combined method” (both voluntary and mandatory) for financing the operations.
Article 34 of the UN Charter.
We use the Baruch Plan as a generic term symbolizing initial ideas and concepts of controlling the A-bomb and nuclear energy through the establishment of an international atomic development authority, which were generated in the 1940s by Niels Bohr, Robert Oppenheimer, and other scientists and administrators involved in the Manhattan Project, and were embodied in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.
Some interesting ideas on international control were suggested by Edward Teller, “Revival of the Baruch Plan,” January 1992; and Roger D. Speed, “The International Control of Nuclear Weapons,” July 1993, CISAC, Stanford University (both unpublished manuscripts).
It is worth recalling that President Eisenhower, who proposed the Atoms for Peace plan, which led to the creation of the IAEA, thought of it as a step towards a more far-reaching scheme of nuclear energy control. In a letter to his brother Milton of December 11, 1953, three days after the Atoms for Peace proposal was submitted by him to the United Nations, Eisenhower wrote: “It all grew out of my original basic idea that as long as the more extensive Baruch plan had been rejected by the Soviets...that possibly a gradual approach would open up new possibilities, new lines of study, and bring some hope to replace fear in the world.” Quoted in McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 290.
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Timerbaev, R.M. (1995). Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes beyond 1995. In: Pilat, J.F., Pendley, R.E. (eds) 1995: A New Beginning for the NPT?. Issues in International Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1947-8_2
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