Abstract
The debate about the scope and limits of public intervention in the economy has often focused upon sectors strongly financed by the state like education or the arts, in which public support is often seen as the source of wasteful decisions, economic inefficiency, managerial rent-seeking and overproduction.
The Author wishes to thank Jean-Jacques Laffont, Malcolm Rees, Martin Ricketts and Keith Shaw for the comments at an earlier version of this paper. The usual caveat applies.
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Trimarchi, M. (2001). Incentive Failure and The Market for Information Goods. In: Marrelli, M., Pignataro, G. (eds) Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1583-8_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1583-8_9
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