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Abstract

In the theory of endogenous policy making, government decisions may be influenced by self-interested agents or lobbies, mainly through the transfer of resources or information. Starting from the pioneering studies of Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), Tullock (1980) and Becker (1983, 1985), which investigated the influence of interest groups in regulatory policy making and rent dissipation for favour seeking, there has been an enormous diffusion of lobbying models in several areas of research, such as: electoral competition [Austen-Smith (1987), Baron (1989ab, 1994), Coughlin et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1996), Morton and Cameron (1992)], international trade [Magee et al. (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), Hillman (1989), Leidy (1994), Mayer (1984)], public procurement [Laffont and Tirole (1993), McLachlan (1985)], fiscal federalism [Hoyt and Toma (1989), Grossman (1989, 1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)], tax reform [van Velthoven and van Winden (1991), Winer and Hettich (1993)], economic transition [Gelb et al. (1997), Hillman (1994)], economic growth [Olson (1982), Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994), van Velthoven (1989)].

Keywords

Interest Group Public Choice American Political Science Review Electoral Competition Campaign Contribution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Isidoro Mazza
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CataniaItaly

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