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Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence pp 361–374Cite as

The Role(s) of Belief in AI

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Part of the book series: The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science ((SECS,volume 597))

Abstract

Beliefs play complex and sometimes confusing roles in AI. This paper surveys (i) a variety of notions of belief, (ii) formal efforts to characterize beliefs, and (iii) how beliefs are related to action, to language, and to commonsense. In addition, we will consider certain logical tensions between beliefs and consistency.

The author would like to express thanks for support for this research, from grants funded by AFOSR and ONR.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Advanced Computer Studies and Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA

    Don Perlis

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  1. Don Perlis
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Advanced Computer Studies and Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, USA

    Jack Minker

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Perlis, D. (2000). The Role(s) of Belief in AI. In: Minker, J. (eds) Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence. The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science, vol 597. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1567-8_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1567-8_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5618-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-1567-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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