Abstract
In response to rapidly rising insurance prices, Pennsylvania was one of several states to adopt no-fault auto insurance in the 1970s. The Pennsylvania no-fault law, passed in 1975, included a $750 monetary tort threshold and unlimited no-fault medical benefits. However, because of the easily reached tort threshold, the new law failed to stabilize costs; and so, in 1984 the legislature acted again, this time repealing the tort threshold, while leaving in place an “add-on” system of no-fault “CAT Fund” benefits capped at $1,000,000 (see Powers, 1989).
Article Footnote
I Support for this research was provided in part by a grant from the Fox School of Business and Management.The author would like to thank Jen McDonald for her assistance in gathering and formatting the data used in this analysis
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© 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Regan, L. (2001). Determinants of The Selection of Full or Limited Tort Auto Insurance in Pennsylvania: an Empirical Analysis. In: Lascher, E.L., Powers, M.R. (eds) The Economics and Politics of Choice No-Fault Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security, vol 24. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1541-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1541-8_7
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