Abstract
To consider wrongs as merely incidental to remedies; to inquire for what injuries a particular action may be brought, instead of explaining the injuries themselves, and then asking what action may be brought for their redress; seems to me to reverse the natural order of things
Article Footnote
I This research was funded by the Institute for Civil Justice(ICJ)at RAND.The conclusions herein do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the ICJ,RAND,or its sponsors.The author would like to thank Stephen Carroll,Kanika Kapur,Michelle White,and Beth Giddens for their careful reviews of earlier drafts of this chapter
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Kabler, B. (2001). The Case Against Auto Choice. In: Lascher, E.L., Powers, M.R. (eds) The Economics and Politics of Choice No-Fault Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security, vol 24. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1541-8_4
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