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Program Content Regulation Revisited

  • L. A. PoweJr.

Abstract

The subordinate First Amendment status of over-the-air broadcasting is long-standing and well-known. Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 1 authorized the Commission to require broadcasters to air material (free of charge) that the broadcaster did not wish to air. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 2 authorized the Commission to impose sanctions on stations airing programming that the Commission deemed indecent.

Keywords

Federal Communication Commission Free Speech Content Regulation Cable System Cable Operator 
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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. A. PoweJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Texas at AustinUSA

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