Advertisement

Liberty, Markets, and Federalism

  • Thomas R. Dye

Abstract

In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself(Federalist, Number 51).

Keywords

Public Good National Government Federal System Cash Benefit Fiscal Federalism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Alden v. Maine. (1999)Google Scholar
  2. Bish, Robert L. (1987) “Federalism: A Market Economics Perspective.” CATO Journal 7: 377–397.Google Scholar
  3. Dye, Thomas R. (1970) American Federalism Competition Among Governments, Lexington: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
  4. Elazar, Daniel J. (1981) “The States as Polities in the Federal System.” National Civic Review 2: 77–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Elazar, Daniel J. (1966) American Federalism: A View from the States. New York: Crowell.Google Scholar
  6. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. (1985) 469 US 528.Google Scholar
  7. Greve, Michael S. (1999) Real Federalism, Washington: AEI Press.Google Scholar
  8. Grodzins, Morton. (1966) The American System, Chicago: Rand McNally.Google Scholar
  9. Holcombe, Randall G. (1986) An Economic Analysis of Democracy, Carbondale IL: Carbondale University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander and Jay, John. (1937) The Federalist, New York: Modem Library.Google Scholar
  11. Oates, Wallace. (1972) Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.Google Scholar
  12. Osborne, David. (1988) Laboratories of Democracy, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.Google Scholar
  13. Ostrom, Vincent. (1971) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.Google Scholar
  14. Peterson, Paul E. (1995) The Price ofFederalism, Washington: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
  15. Reese, Charles. (1978) State and Community Government in the Federal System, NewYork: John Wiley.Google Scholar
  16. Sanford, Terry. (1967) Storm Over the States, New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
  17. Seminole Tribe v. Florida. (1996) 517 U.S. 44.Google Scholar
  18. Shannon, John. (1987) “The Return to Fend-For-Yourself Federalism.” Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual meeting.Google Scholar
  19. Sundquist, James L. (1979) Making Federalism Work, Washington: Brooking Institution.Google Scholar
  20. Tarbell Case, (1871) 13 Wall. 397.Google Scholar
  21. Tiebout, Charles M. (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 64:416–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. U.S. v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549.Google Scholar
  23. Wildavsky, Aaron. (1985) “Federalism Means Inequality.” Society, 22: 5–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas R. Dye

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations