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Site-Value Taxation and the Rule of Law

  • Fred E. Foldvary

Abstract

Site-value taxation (SVT) consists of basing public revenue on the value of real estate sites or the rental obtainable from such sites, excluding the value and rental of any improvements such as buildings. This chapter examines the economics of SVT and compares the economic effects of this method with that of other types of taxes. It then delves into the ethical and political nature of the rule of law and analyzes the comparative effects of site-value taxation versus other taxes on governance. Finally, the chapter examines how SVT facilitates a more decentralized governance and other constitutional provisions that could provide community Services more congruent with the desires of the people affected.

Keywords

Economic Freedom Capital Good Market Rental Excess Burden Public Revenue 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fred E. Foldvary

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