From Love Dynamics to Relationship Marketing: The Case of Linear Partners
This paper opens the complex issue of relationship marketing to formal modeling using differential equations. Our purpose is to examine how relational commitment is established, developed and maintained in a context of symmetric and asymmetric partners.We present three main findings. The rates of commitment of the seller and the buyer are higher when both partners are engaged in a symmetric relational exchange. A consciously attractive buyer is reluctant to develop a long-term relationship with an unreliable seller. Neither a very low level of opportunistic inclination nor a very high level of trust is healthy for the relational commitment.
KeywordsDifferential Game Opportunistic Behavior Relational Exchange Relationship Marketing Exchange Partner
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