Abstract
Given the existence of zero and low tax investors willing to buy debt, finance theory suggests that the relationship
is reasonably indicative of the consequences of substituting debt for equity. If (math) for all investors then the more complex relationship
simplifies to equation (1).
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References
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Bierman, H. (2003). Disparate Objectives. In: The Capital Structure Decision. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1037-6_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1037-6_13
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