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Abstract

Given the existence of zero and low tax investors willing to buy debt, finance theory suggests that the relationship

$$ {V_L} = {V_u} + {t_c}B $$
(1)

is reasonably indicative of the consequences of substituting debt for equity. If (math) for all investors then the more complex relationship

$$ {V_L} = {V_u} + B\left[ {1 - \frac{{(1 - {t_c})(c - {t_s})}}{{1 - {t_p}}}} \right] $$
(2)

simplifies to equation (1).

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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Bierman, H. (2003). Disparate Objectives. In: The Capital Structure Decision. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1037-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1037-6_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5363-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-1037-6

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