On Exchange and Deceit

  • Holger Bonus

Abstract

Exchange is the act of giving or taking one thing in return for another. Exchanges are made because the parties to the deal wish to receive a good or service which is of value to them. Since the good or service received may turn out less valuable than expected, the possibility exists that parties find themselves deceived. It is interesting to see whether deceit is inevitable or just a possibility when it comes to exchange.

Keywords

Institutional Change Money Supply Cultural Knowledge Credence Quality Credible Commitment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for “lemons’: Quality, uncertainty, and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Alston, L.J., Eggertson, T., & North, D.C. (Eds.) (1996). Empirical studies in institutional change. Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Backhaus, K. & Bonus, H. (1998). Unternehmens-Identität und Stil. In K. Backhaus & H. Bonus, Die Beschleunigungsfalle oder der Triumph der Schildkröte (3rd. ed.). Stuttgart: Schäffer Poeschel Verlag.Google Scholar
  4. Bonus, Holger (1990). Wertpapiere, Geld und Gold — Über das Unwirkliche in der Ökonomie. Graz/Wien/Köln: Styria Verlag.Google Scholar
  5. Bonus, Holger (1994). Das Selbstverständnis moderner Genossenschaften. Tübingen.Google Scholar
  6. Bonus, Holger (1995a). Precarious relationships in economics (Working Paper Series, No. 9501). Pittsburgh: Center for Research on Contracts and the Structure of Enterprise, The Katz School, University of Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  7. Bonus, Holger (1995b). Europäische Identität aus ökonomischer Sicht. In Henrichmeyer, et al. (Eds), Auf der Suche nach europäischer Sicht (pp. 67–100). Bonn: Europa Union Verlag.Google Scholar
  8. Bonus, Holger (1990). Wenn die Vertrauensbildung zum Schlüsselfaktor wird. Kulturökonomische Überlegungen zum Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung Nr. 146 vom 27728. Juni 1998, 61.Google Scholar
  9. Bonus, Holger & Ronte, Dieter (1997a). Die Wa(h)re Kunst (2nd ed.). Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel-Verlag.Google Scholar
  10. Bonus, Holger & Ronte, Dieter (1997b). Credibility and economic value in the visual arts. Journal of Cultural Economics, 21, 103–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Claessens, Dieter (1980). Das Konkrete und das Abstrakte — Soziologische Skizzen zur Anthropologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.Google Scholar
  12. Darby, M.R. & Karni, E. (1973). Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. Journal of Law and Economics, XVI, 67–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Denzau, A.T. & North, D.C. (1994). Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. Kyklos, 47, 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Dietl, H. (1993). Institutionen und Zeit. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).Google Scholar
  15. Erikson, Erik H. (1959). Identity and the lifecycle (Monograph, Psychological Issues, Vol. I, No. 1). New York: International Universities Press.Google Scholar
  16. Goldberg, Victor P. (1989) [1980]. Relational exchange: Economics and complex contracts. American Behavioral Scientist, 23 (1980), 337–352. Reprinted in V.P. Goldberg (Ed.), Readings in the Economics of Contract Law (pp. 16–20). Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press 1989. Quotation refers to the reprinted version.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Klamer, A. (Ed.) (1996). The value of culture — On the relationship between economics and arts. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Krappmann, Lothar (1982) [1969]. Soziologische Dimensionen der Identität: Strukturelle Bedingungen für die Teilnahme an Interaktionsprozessen (6th ed.). Stuttgart.Google Scholar
  19. Landes, D.S. (1998). The wealth and poverty of nations — Why some are so rich and some so poor. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.Google Scholar
  20. Lübbe, Hermann (1979). Zur Identitätsrepräsentation der Historie. In O. Marquard & K. Stierle (Ed.), Identität: Politik und Hermeneutik (pp. 277–292). München.Google Scholar
  21. Nelson, P. (1970). Information and consumer behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. North, D.C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.Google Scholar
  23. North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. The political economy of institutions and decisions.: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  24. North, D.C. (1993). Institutions and credible commitment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149, 11–23.Google Scholar
  25. Powell, W.W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295–336.Google Scholar
  26. Ripperger, T. (1998). Ökonomik des Vertrauens — Analyse eines Organisationsprinzips. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.Google Scholar
  27. Ronte, D. & Bonus, H. (1993). Werbung. Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik, 38, 243–259.Google Scholar
  28. Rubin, P. H. (1978). The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract. Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 223–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Schanze, E. (1991). Symbiotic contracts: Exploring long-term agency structures between contract and corporation. In Ch. Joerges (Ed.), Franchising and the law: Theoretical and comparative approaches in Europe and the United States (pp. 67–104). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.Google Scholar
  30. Schanze, E. (1993). Symbiotic arrangements. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149, 691–697.Google Scholar
  31. Stone, A., Levy, B. & Paredes, R. (1996). Public institutions and private transactions: A comparative analysis of the legal and regulatory environment for business transactions in Brazil and Chile. In L.J. Alston et al. (Eds.), Empirical studies in institutional change (pp. 95–128). Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Frederick C. Mish, Ed. in chief) (1985). Springfield/Mass.: Merriam-Webster.Google Scholar
  33. Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism — Firms, markets, relational contracting. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
  34. Winiecki, J. (1996). Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet System: A property rights-based approach. In L.J. Alston et al. (Eds.), Empirical studies in institutional change (pp. 63–91). Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Winiecki, J. (1996). Transaction cost and economic development. In L.J. Alston et al. (Eds.), Empirical studies in institutional change (pp. 92–94). Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Holger Bonus

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations