New Hazards to Enterprise and Inclusion: Investment Stimuli and Workweek Reduction

  • Edmund S. Phelps

Abstract

The project ITALY IN EUROPE addresses the question, made urgent by the challenges and opportunities from entry into the European Monetary Union, of how Italian government policy can best defend and promote enterprise and inclusion in the nation’s formal economy.1 If firms operating in Italy, national or foreign, fall far short of being as enterprising as many competing firms elsewhere in EMU, rewards to working and investing in Italy will suffer a relative deterioration—and inclusion will be further set back. If Italy’s formal economy remains unable to enlist the great majority of its working-age people, schemes for alternative work and alternative economic support generally will gain adoption, further weakening the economy—and the recent revival of private enterprise will be jeopardized.

Keywords

Migration Europe Income Expense Tated 

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References

  1. 2.
    See for example “Euro Prophet Raymond Barre Sees Europe Approaching a Golden Age,” by Anne Swardson, International Herald Tribune, April 30,1998, p. 1, and Hugo Dixon, “EMU’s Capital Consequences,” Financial Times, 30 April 1998, p. 17.Google Scholar
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    Hian Teck Hoon and Edmund Phelps, “Effeti economici del ‘work sharing’ in un modello dinamico di ‘turnover,’“Rivista di Politico Economica, 84, November 1994, 105–126. This model is in the same vein as the turnover-training model used above to study the effects of a capital subsidy.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

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  • Edmund S. Phelps

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