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Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in Water Resources

  • Ariel Dinar
  • Aaron Ratner
  • Dan Yaron
Chapter
Part of the Natural Resource Management and Policy book series (NRMP, volume 24)

Abstract

Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) provides unique and efficient solutions in situations where decisions can be made both independently and collectively by a relatively small number of agents (players). For these cases, CGT is a better model of rational or efficient behavior than a market model. The latter model assumes a large number of players who do not interact except through market price. From this perspective CGT might be inferior to market models since the comparison among players is not fully captured on the basis of utility scales (as apposed to market price).

Keywords

Water Resource Research Grand Coalition Cost Allocation Regional Income Cooperative Game Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ariel Dinar
    • 1
  • Aaron Ratner
    • 2
  • Dan Yaron
    • 3
  1. 1.University of California and USDA- ERSDavisUSA
  2. 2.Tel-Aviv College for Business AdministrationIsrael
  3. 3.Institute of Agricultural EconomicsUniversity of OxfordUK

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