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Challenges in Designing Default Retail Electric Service

What Regulated Retail Services Should Be Available Following Restructuring
  • John L. Jurewitz
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 42)

Abstract

A key question in any state’s electricity restructuring plan is whether some form of retail power service should continue to be offered on a regulated basis under certain circumstances to some customers. This question is both a short-term (transitional) and a long-term (post-transitional) issue. So far, in every state adopting retail competition, utility distribution companies (UDCs) have been required to offer retail service on a regulated basis at least during a transition period. Generally, these arrangements have been part and parcel of complex comprehensive political settlements involving many issues including UDC recovery of stranded costs. But the post-transition responsibilities of UDCs to provide regulated retail service have usually been deferred as issues “to be determined” in later regulatory proceedings.

Keywords

Profit Margin Wholesale Price Retail Prex Wholesale Prex Windfall Profit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • John L. Jurewitz
    • 1
  1. 1.Southern California EdisonUSA

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