Abstract
In one sense, the term “altruism” refers to the tendency to act altruistically. In another sense, it refers to an ethical theory that seeks to justify acting altruistically. Clearly, by “altruism as the condition of subjectivity,” I mean altruism in the first sense. I call the person who is disposed to act altruistically the “practical altruist,” and the philosopher who subscribes to the ethical theory of altruism the “theoretical altruist.” Whether to be an altruist of one kind is ipso facto to be an altruist of the other kind is not my concern in this paper. The aim of the paper is firstly to explicate, and secondly to provide some support for, a moral theory, due to Emmanuel Levinas, according to which to be a moral subject at all, one has to be a practical altruist.
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Notes
A slightly longer version of this paper was published in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 74 (2000), pp. 637–652. Permission from the editors of ACPQ to have the paper reprinted here is gratefully acknowledged.
Nicholas Rescher, Unselfishness: The Role of Vicarious Affects in Moral Philosophy and Social Theory (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p.6.
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Quotations from this work are indicated by TI followed by page numbers.
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Quotations from this work are indicated by OB followed by page numbers.
Martha Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion,” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 13 (1996), pp.27–58, at p.29.
See also Felicia Ackerman, “Pity as a Moral Concept/The Morality of Pity,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.20 (l995), pp.59–66, and Eamonn Callan, “The Moral Status of Pity,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 18(1998), pp.1–12.
“Pity,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vo1.37(1999), pp.77–87.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p.224.
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Nuyen, A.T. (2002). Altruism As The Condition Of Subjectivity. In: Kapur, B.K., Chong, KC. (eds) Altruistic Reveries. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0809-0_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0809-0_4
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