Market-Based Mechanisms for Environmental Improvement

  • Jay S. Coggins
  • Paolo Rosato


Market-based mechanism for pollution control are becoming more popular both in the environmental economics literature and in the real-world policymaking. This paper contains a review of the ideas behind these mechanisms. A brief example illustrates the appeal of both effluent taxes and permit-trading schemes, and compares and contrasts the two. This is followed by a review of some of the market-based schemes in use around the world. The paper finishes with a summary of performance in the U.S. sulphur dioxide allowance-trading market.


Abatement Cost Marginal Abatement Cost Deadweight Loss Permit Market Trading Program 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jay S. Coggins
    • 1
  • Paolo Rosato
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Applied EconomicsUniversity of MinnesotaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Civil EngineeringUniversity of TriesteItaly

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