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Calculated Choices: Who Profits?

  • S. G. Van Der Lecq

Abstract

In the Netherlands, government elections have a unique feature: the election programmes of the (larger) parties are assessed for their economic impact by the independent CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). This bureau was founded by Jan Tinbergen, with the explicit aim to increase the understanding of the workings of the economy without any inference of political norms.1 By building models to calculate such workings, the insight was gained and became increasingly used for underpinning the Dutch governmental policy actions.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Economic Impact Political Party Calculation Procedure Baseline Scenario 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. G. Van Der Lecq

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