Abstract
Moving on to the systematicity of inference argument, we begin to collect on our investment in the history and philosophy of science made back in Chapter 2. Here we hope to see how Fodor and Pylyshyn think that structural features of the accounts offered by Classicism and Pure Atomism provide some defeasible reason to think that human cognition is Classical. The principal problem for Pure Atomism is that, while it is able to develop a system that displays systematic relations among inferences, this is not all that has to be accomplished in order to explain the systematic relations. In this chapter, we begin with a relatively lengthy discussion and defense of the truth of the explanandum, then turn to an examination of the Classical and Pure Atomistic accounts of the explanandum. The surprising conclusion in this chapter will be that, while Pure Atomism does not meet the explanatory standard Fodor and Pylyshyn are aiming for, neither does Classicism.
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Notes
Cf., Rowlands, (1997), who also supposes that an isomorphism between representations and propositions is also supposed to underlie various arguments for combinatorial/linguistic representations.
Cf. Fodor, (1987), p. 136, p. 138.
In his discussion the systematicity of cognitive representations, Cummins, (1996b), p. 595–6, appears to recognize that systematicity does not require the view that propositions have structure.
Perhaps a desire to avoid such an obligation is the reason why Dennett is sometimes inclined simply to deny that there is such a thing as the systematicity of inference that merits an explanation. Cf., Dennett, (1991).
Dennett, (1991), p. 27, appears to want to run this sort of argument using research on vervet monkeys. Unfortunately, Dennett’s discussion is not sufficiently clear or extensive as to indicate whether the evidence is supposed to show that vervet thought is not inferentially systematic or that vervet thought is not compositional in the sense to be explained in Chapter
Nor is his discussion sufficiently detailed as to enable one to ascertain exactly what the evidence is supposed to be.
van Gelder and Niklasson have a rhetorically unstable view at this point. In much of their paper (and in Niklasson and van Gelder, (1994)) they complain about a lack of clarity in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s concept of systematicity, but when it suits their purposes they are able to formulate a perfectly reasonable definition of the systematicity of modus tollens.
Van Gelder & Niklasson, (1994), p. 906, also suggest this idea.
Both Cummins, (1996b), and van Gelder and Niklasson, (1994), are in a rhetorically unstable position here. On the one hand, they both complain of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s inattention to the literature on human inference, but, on the other hand, when it comes to citing literature relevant to substantiating their skepticism about the systematicity of conjunction elimination, they have nothing to cite. Recall that Cummins writes, it is an embarrassment to classical schemes that structure sensitive processing, unless constrained in some way, will treat ‘(A v B v C) & (D v E v F)’ in the same way it treats ‘(P&Q)’. I am not sure about this particular example (Cummins, 1996b, p. 613). Van Gelder and Niklasson for their part give us this: Fodor & Pylyshyn single out the systematicity of inference as a key component of the wider phenomenon of systematicity. It is, roughly, the idea that the ability to make some inferences is intrinsically connected to the ability to make other, logically related inferences. They offer no precise definition of the phenomenon and cite no literature in its support, but do anecdotally illustrate what they have in mind the following way: You don’t, for example, find minds that are prepared to infer John went to the store from John and Mary and Susan and Sally went to the store and John and Mary went to the store but not from John and Mary and Susan went to the store, (p. 48). Perhaps; perhaps not (van Gelder & Niklasson, 1994, p. 906). If they wish to take Fodor and Pylyshyn to task for armchair speculation about human inferential capacities, they would do well to cite experimental literature when advancing their own claims about human inferential capacities. Certainly more than “I am not sure about this particular example” and “Perhaps, perhaps not” is in order.
Fodor & Pylyshyn, (1988), p. 47–48.
This issue was raised by an anonymous reviewer for the book.
Suppose, however, that we were to have a full-fledged, detailed, well-confirmed selectionist account of the way in which evolution gave rise to systematic inferential capacities. Would that relieve Pure Atomism of its explanatory burden? McLaughlin, (1993b), has claimed that an evolutionary account would not meet the Classicist’s challenge and, surely, the Classicist can issue whatever challenges he may like. Still, one might wonder about the legitimacy of the challenge. While one can see that there must be some explanation of the systematicity of inference, it is not clear what it must be an architectural explanation. If the explanandum must be architectural, why must it be architectural? This is a rather subtle question in the philosophy of science that would bear further exploration.
The foregoing addresses Hadley, (1997), who observes the symmetry between Classicism and Connectionism, but draws the inference that both are explanatory. He does this on the ground that both theories, when given appropriate auxiliary hypotheses, necessitate the explanandum. Contrary to Hadley, however, Chapter 2 argued that necessitation of the explanandum is still not sufficient for explanation in the sense at work in the systematicity arguments. Both theories rely on arbitrary hypotheses which undermine their explanatory power.
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Aizawa, K. (2003). The Systematicity of Inference. In: The Systematicity Arguments. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0275-3_4
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