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The Evaluation of Voting Technology

  • Douglas W. Jones
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 7)

Abstract

The voting technologies in common use today each have distinct strengths and weaknesses. These technologies cannot be evaluated in isolation, but must be evaluated as parts of a larger social and legal system, as demonstrated by a discussion of the problems with the voting technologies in wide use today, the Australian ballot, including punched card and optical mark-sense ballots, and direct recording voting machines, including mechanical lever machines. Alternate models for canvassing and remote voting further complicate the evaluation.

Key words

History Australian ballot Human factors Canvassing Remote Voting 
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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Douglas W. Jones
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of IowaUSA

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