Logical Foundations of Social Science Research

Chapter
Part of the Integrated Series in Information Systems book series (ISIS, volume 34)

Abstract

In this chapter, I want to review the four inferential logics (1) induction, (2) deduction, (3) abduction, and (4) retroduction which we use to develop the conjectures or hypotheses when doing theory development.

Keywords

Posit Harman 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Some of the material in this chapter previously appeared in: “Using Decision Tree Modelling to Support Peircian Abduction in IS Research: A Systematic Approach for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses for Systematic Theory Development,” Information Systems Journal 21:5, 407–440 (2011).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ryerson UniversityTed Rogers School of ManagementTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Faculty of CommerceUniversity of Cape TownCape TownSouth Africa

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