Abstract
While there is increasing momentum behind the notion that the tools of transitional justice should be marshaled in response to large-scale human rights atrocities and physical violence—including murder, rape, torture, disappearances, and other crimes against humanity—the proper role of transitional justice with respect to economic violence—including violations of economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural resources—is far less certain. Historically, if mass atrocities and physical violence have been placed in the transitional justice spotlight, issues of equally devastating economic and social justice have received little attention. The marginalization of the economic within the transitional justice agenda serves to distort our understanding of conflict, and the policies thought to be necessary in the wake of conflict. This chapter argues that a more nuanced, contextualized, and balanced approach to a wider range of justice issues faced by societies in transition is necessary. To this end, this chapter proposes that one way to achieve a more balanced approach would be to reconceptualize and reorient the “transition” of transitional justice not simply as a transition to democracy and the “rule of law,” the paradigm under which the field originated, but as part of a broader transition to “positive peace” in which justice for both physical violence and economic violence receives equal pride of place.
This chapter has been adapted from an article first published in the Fordham International Law Journal 35, no. 3 (2012): 780–814.
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Notes
- 1.
See Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” Fordham International Law Journal 26, no. 4 (2002): 894 (noting the emergence of a “steady-state” phase of transitional justice in which “the post-conflict dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception to the norm”); see also Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008): 276 (noting the standardization of transitional justice).
- 2.
See International Crisis Group, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa Report no. 87 (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 2004), 9 (criticizing a mechanistic “operational checklist” approach to postconflict peacebuilding in which the international community assumes it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a series of initiatives: Deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, security sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, finally, a first election).
- 3.
For an interesting discussion of how this seeming consensus masks a deeper politicization and debate, see generally Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2008): 95.
- 4.
See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 280–286 (employing the categories of when, whom, and what in order to challenge the “standardization” of field of transitional justice). For a discussion of the idea that it may not always be the case that we need to “do something” in the transitional justice context, see Prisilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2011), 183–205.
- 5.
See Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 4 (discussing why “economic, social, and cultural rights have not traditionally been a central part of transitional justice initiatives”).
- 6.
See Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 275–276.
- 7.
See Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 56; see also Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 580–581.
- 8.
See Miller, “Effects of Invisibility,” 268.
- 9.
See Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 22 (arguing that civil wars are more likely in low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and have negative effects that persist well after formal cessation of hostilities). Collier once famously argued that over 50 % of civil wars reignite within a period of five years of their supposed settlement. See Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler, “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,” Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 17. However, both figures have been disputed by some and revised by Collier himself. See, e.g., Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, “What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 2 (2007): 197–198 (explaining how they and others have arrived at figures closer to 20 % after using the Correlates of War data set, and citing Collier’s 2006 working paper, which established a 23 % war recurrence rate for the first four years after the cessation of conflict).
- 10.
See Evelyne Schmid, “War Crimes Related to Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” Heidelberg Journal of International Law 71, no. 3 (2011): 3, 5, 9–17.
- 11.
See Roger Duthie, “Transitional Justice, Development, and Economic Violence,” in this volume.
- 12.
As discussed in greater detail below, the term “negative peace” refers to the absence of direct violence. It stands in contrast with the broader concept of “positive peace,” which includes the absence of both direct and indirect violence, including various forms of “structural violence” such as poverty, hunger, and other forms of social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167.
- 13.
See, e.g., chapter by Chris Albin-Lackey in this volume, which explains how corruption may in some instances be tantamount to a violation of economic and social rights under international law, while in other instances such a case may be impossible to make.
- 14.
For a review of the use of what have become known as the tools of transitional justice dating back to more than 2,000 years ago in ancient Athens, see generally Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Other authors looking to the historical underpinnings of transitional justice practice identify the Nuremburg tribunal as a key juncture initiating the first “phase” of transitional justice. See Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 70.
- 15.
See generally Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume I. General Considerations (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). While the term “transitional justice” was coined some 20 years ago, it has been argued that transitional justice did not coalesce as a distinct “field” until sometime after 2000. See Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 329–332 (tracing the history of the use of the term “transitional justice”); Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 7 (arguing that transitional justice did not emerge as a distinct field until after 2000).
- 16.
Many of these definitions have been quite narrow and legalistic. For example, Ruti Teitel defines transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 69. For a review of how some of these definitions have broadened over time, see Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 277–278.
- 17.
See Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” 582–583.
- 18.
See Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 13 (discussing the different overlapping conceptions of the field of transitional justice).
- 19.
See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 325 (arguing that transition to democracy was the “dominant normative lens” through which political change was viewed in the early years of transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 273 (arguing that “‘[t]ransition’, as normally conceived within transitional justice theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of democratization and democracy based on liberal and essentially Western formulations of democracy”).
- 20.
See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 326.
- 21.
Ibid., 358.
- 22.
In recent years, transitional justice advocates have tended to see the various and sometimes contradictory goals of transitional justice as complementary. See Leebaw, “Irreconcilable Goals,” 98. The mutual complementary of peace, justice, and democracy has also become a United Nations (UN) doctrine at least since the 2004 publication of a report on transitional justice. See United Nations Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Societies,” UN Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004), 1 (arguing that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”).
- 23.
See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume I. General Considerations, ed. Neil Kritz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 65–81; Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” in Kritz, Transitional Justice, 57–64.
- 24.
See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 333.
- 25.
See Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the Liberal Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 541 (noting the “strong and persistent influence of legalism on transitional justice”); Bell, “Interdisciplinary,” 9 (discussing the broadening of the field to include disciplines beyond law); Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 417 (criticizing the legalistic penchant of transitional justice and arguing that “legalism tends to foreclose questions from other complementary disciplines and perspectives which transitional lawyers should be both asking and asked”). See generally Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 28 (calling for a revalorization of local and cultural approaches to justice and reconciliation).
- 26.
Chandra Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, Johanna Herman, “Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice,” JAD-PbP Working Paper Series No 1. (May 2009), 13 (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of peacebuilding activities).
- 27.
McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 412. For an argument that the “dilemmas” of transitional justice are not exceptional, but in fact resemble those of “ordinary justice,” see generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, “Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice,” Harvard Law Review 117, no. 3 (2003): 761.
- 28.
See Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” 894; Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 89–92.
- 29.
Leebaw, “Irreconcilable Goals,” 103, 106.
- 30.
For example, according to a landmark UN report, transitional justice “comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” See United Nations Secretary-General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice,” 8.
- 31.
See Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 315.
- 32.
See, e.g., Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?” 271 (criticizing the “one-size-fits-all” and “top-down” approaches to transitional justice).
- 33.
See Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries; The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 26 (2013): 149–178.
- 34.
Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 13–15.
- 35.
McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 420–21 (positing that “a crude characterization of human rights in contemporary transitional justice discourses would suggest that human rights talk lends itself to a ‘Western-centric’ and top-down focus; it self-presents (at least) as apolitical; [and] it includes a capacity to disconnect from the real political and social world of transition through a process of ‘magical legalism’”).
- 36.
This is not to minimize the legacies of colonialism and Cold War politics, or the role of the modern-day scramble for resources in shaping many conflicts in the developing world. Indeed, there has been a persistent failure of transitional justice mechanisms to account for the effects of “outside actors” on the course of conflict. See Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 75–77. There are exceptions to this trend, however, including the work of truth commissions in Chad, Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
- 37.
Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 155.
- 38.
Indeed, the sheer number of indictments emanating from the International Criminal Court involving African countries has generated significant controversy on the continent, leading in part to an African Union vote to halt cooperation with the Court with respect to the indictment of Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir. See BBC News, “African Union in Rift with Court,” July 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8133925.stm. Although countries such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States also would likely benefit from the application of transitional justice practices, great-power politics and Security Council vetoes continue to make this appear less likely than in the smaller, poorer countries of the world.
- 39.
See Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 20–31, 53 (arguing that civil wars are more likely in low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and cause negative effects which persist well after formal cessation of hostilities).
- 40.
See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 284.
- 41.
See Pablo de Greiff, “Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights Violations,” in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8.
- 42.
See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 284 (discussing the standardization of transitional justice).
- 43.
See Patrick Bond, “Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa’s Elite Transition,” International Affairs 60, no. 1 (2006): 141.
- 44.
See Miller, “Effects of Invisibility,” 280–287.
- 45.
Ibid., 268.
- 46.
Lisa Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 337.
- 47.
See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 362.
- 48.
See Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste (CAVR), Chega!, The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, Final Report (2005), 40–41, 140–145.
- 49.
Beyond the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, economic, social, and cultural rights have the status of binding law in a number of international human rights treaties. Examples include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European Social Charter; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.
- 50.
See Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 335; see also Lisa Laplante, “On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to Development,” Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 10 (2007): 148, 159–161 (providing a more detailed analysis of the work of the Peruvian truth commission).
- 51.
Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 350.
- 52.
See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,” UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, July 12, 1993; see also United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 55/2, “Millennium Declaration,” UN Doc A/RES/55/2, Sept. 18, 2000.
- 53.
See Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice,” 6 (discussing the Cold War roots of the current status of economic and social rights).
- 54.
See Kenneth Roth, “Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization,” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2004): 64 (explaining the particular methodological challenges associated with trying to apply a “naming and shaming” documentation strategy to violations of economic and social rights); See generally Curt Goering, “Amnesty International and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” in Ethics in Action; The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations, eds. Daniel Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- 55.
See Arbour, "Economic and Social Justice," 5.
- 56.
See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 333.
- 57.
Human Rights Watch, for example, has in recent years published a number of reports looking at the linkages between natural resources, corruption, and violations of economic and social rights. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, vol. 19, no. 2(A) (New York: Human Rights Watch, January 2007), 15–18, 40–53 (contending that the local government in Rivers State, Nigeria, has violated its duty to progressively realize rights to health and education through widespread and flagrant corruption and mismanagement of oil revenues); Human Rights Watch, Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights, vol. 16, no. 1(A) (New York: Human Rights Watch, January 2004), 57–59 (arguing that, due at least in part to mismanagement and corruption, the government of Angola has impeded Angolans’ ability to enjoy their economic, social, and cultural rights, including healthcare and education, in violation of the government’s own commitments and human rights treaties to which it is a party). This is in stark contrast to their work in the previous decade when violations of economic and social rights would only be examined to the extent that they were associated with violations of civil and political rights such as racial or gender-based discrimination.
- 58.
While in some ways a gross oversimplification, the implicit politics of human rights discourse and practice that is embedded in these oppositions have long been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 109–110 (discussing the foregrounding and backgrounding of human rights discourse); Makau Wa Mutua, “The Ideology of Human Rights,” Virginia Journal of International Law 36, no. 3 (1996) 604–607 (criticizing the peripheral nature of economic and social rights and local and traditional approaches to justice under the mainstream Western approach to human rights thinking and practice).
- 59.
For a review of some of the debates regarding the incorporation of local justice mechanisms into transitional justice initiatives, see generally Roger Duthie, “Local Justice and Reintegration Processes as Complements to Transitional Justice and DDR,” in Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants, eds. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009), 228.
- 60.
See, e.g., Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?” 273–274; McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 417–418.
- 61.
For a much more detailed exploration of this point, see Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries.”
- 62.
See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 359.
- 63.
See Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 14.
- 64.
See Roger Duthie, “Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 307.
- 65.
See, e.g., Huntington, “The Third Wave,” 65–81; O’Donnell and Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” 57–64.
- 66.
See, e.g., Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 350 (discussing how the Guatemalan government largely ignored key recommendations of the Guatemalan Commission on Historical Clarification, including a progressive tax system and increased state spending on human necessities).
- 67.
Ibid., 333–334, 350.
- 68.
See Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Development,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 256 (discussing the problems with the high cost of transitional justice measures in development).
- 69.
Ibid.
- 70.
See Duthie, “Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach,” 306–307.
- 71.
Ibid., 299.
- 72.
Ibid., 302–303.
- 73.
See Carranza, “Plunder and Pain,” 324–325.
- 74.
For a powerful articulation of some of these concerns, see generally Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,” Social and Legal Studies 21 (2012): 171–186.
- 75.
See Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 46 (advocating a “transformative” justice model of transitional justice); see also Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 332 (arguing that truth commissions might contribute to longer-term processes of political and economic transformation).
- 76.
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The New Landscape of Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–8. See generally Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2011) (discussing accountability in the context of prosecutions for human rights abuses).
- 77.
Ibid., 2.
- 78.
See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice verses Peace in Times of Transition (New York, Frank Cass, 2004).
- 79.
As an example of this phenomenon, in 2003, the then chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, President John Kufuor of Ghana, urged the UN to set aside the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the grounds that it was necessary to facilitate a negotiated settlement to Liberia’s civil war. See IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, “Liberia: ECOWAS Chairman Urges UN to Lift Taylor Indictment,” June 30, 2003.
- 80.
Increasingly, there is a recognition that no one mechanism of transitional justice can hope to fulfill the many aspirations ascribed to it, and multiple overlapping mechanisms are thought to be necessary. For an exploration of the “truth versus justice” debate, see generally Miriam Aukerman, “Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crimes: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 39; Reed Brody, “Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?,” The Nation, April 30, 2001, 25. For an argument that international prosecutions can subvert local judicial and reconciliation practices while unwittingly playing into national-level politics, see generally Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs 21, no. 2 (2007): 179.
- 81.
See, e.g., United Nations Secretary-General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice,” 1 (positing that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”); Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, November 2007), 8–9 (arguing that the indictment of Charles Taylor advanced the peace process in Liberia, even though it was criticized at the time as potentially undermining peace negotiations); Louise Arbour, “Justice v. Politics,” The New York Times, Sept. 16, 2008. (justifying her decision to indict Slobodan Milošević by showing that it ultimately advanced the cause of peace, even though it was criticized at the time for threatening the peace process).
- 82.
Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding,” 539 (noting that “few transitional justice scholars have yet situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead through the dominant lens of legalism and human rights”); see Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 29 (noting that “few researchers have analysed the relationship between justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding”).
- 83.
See Galtung, “Violence,” 167; Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 34.
- 84.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman and Alexis Okeowo, “Warlord’s Absence Derails Another Peace Effort in Uganda,” The New York Times, Apr. 12, 2008 (discussing the refusal of Joseph Kony, leader of a rebel group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army that is responsible for widespread human rights abuses in Uganda and neighboring countries, to attend peace negotiations due in part to indictments from the International Criminal Court).
- 85.
Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” 898.
- 86.
See generally Galtung, “Violence,” 167 (discussing different constructions of “positive peace” and “negative peace”).
- 87.
See Alexander Boraine, “Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation,” Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 1 (2006): 26.
- 88.
Ibid.
- 89.
See generally Diane Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991): 2537 (discussing the duty to prosecute or grant amnesty under international law).
- 90.
I distinguish here between what I am calling peacebuilding at the “international institutional level,” which emanates from the United Nations and other international institutions, and the various types of interpersonal, community-level, and “track-two” peacebuilding that are done by individuals, religious groups, and NGOs.
- 91.
Some refer to three different generations of peacekeeping, which evolved in quick succession in the early 1990 s. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 238. Others, such as Roland Paris, distinguish between “traditional peacekeeping” and “peace operations.” See Roland Paris, “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 3 (2003): 448–450.
- 92.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 18.
- 93.
See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 280 (noting various transitional justice initiatives associated with peacebuilding).
- 94.
See Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding,” 538 (describing how transitional justice has become “an apparatus within the wider peacebuilding ‘package’”); Sriram, “Justice as Peace?,” 585 (arguing that “responses to recent mass atrocities or human rights abuses are now an integral part of peacebuilding by bilateral donors, regional organisations, and international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank”).
- 95.
For a more detailed look at potential connections between transitional justice and development, see generally Duthie, “Transitional Justice, Development, and Economic Violence”; Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds., Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009).
- 96.
Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 360.
- 97.
Ibid., 361.
- 98.
Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” 580.
- 99.
See Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits,” 56; see also Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” 580.
- 100.
For this reason, Roland Paris advocates what he calls “institutionalization before liberalization,” which would prioritize strengthening institutions and regulations before any rush to elections. See Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits,” 57–58.
- 101.
For a more elaborate discussion of this point, see generally Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” 579.
- 102.
Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 27.
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Sharp, D.N. (2014). Introduction: Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition. In: Sharp, D. (eds) Justice and Economic Violence in Transition. Springer Series in Transitional Justice, vol 5. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8172-0_1
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