Abstract
Hardware Security Modules/(HSMs), also known as Tamper Resistant Security Modules (TRSMs), are devices dedicated to performing cryptographic functions such as data encryption/decryption, certificate management and calculation of specific values such as card verification values (CVVs) or Personal Identification Numbers (PINs). What these devices offer is tamper response, the capability to detect any attacks on their surface and securely delete the sensitive content stored in their memory. Such devices are manufactured to meet specific criteria [e.g. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)] and must be appropriately managed throughout their whole lifecycle. Together with encryption algorithms, cryptographic functions and vendor provided functionalities, they host one or more cryptographic keys that respond to automated or manual commands. Physical security and key management are essential in order to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the keys and these requirements are properly described in various standards. Due to the specific functionality of HSMs, there have been many published attacks via the command interface, which reinforces the need for adequate controls, both physical and logical, around these devices.
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Notes
- 1.
The term “tamper resistant”, in this context includes “tamper-evident” and “tamper-detective” that will often appear in this chapter and which can be used interchangeably, as well as “tamper responsive” which refers to the reaction of the device in a tamper attack.
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Mavrovouniotis, S., Ganley, M. (2014). Hardware Security Modules. In: Markantonakis, K., Mayes, K. (eds) Secure Smart Embedded Devices, Platforms and Applications. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7915-4_17
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